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PROTECTING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE
INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET: NOTICE
AND CONSENT IN THE AGE OF
BEHAVIORAL TARGETING
Andrew Hotaling t
"You already have zero privacy. Get over it."'
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Nielson/NetRatings, an Internet media and market research
firm, the number of active Internet home users in the United States in July
2007 grew to 148,128,321 users, increasing nearly one percent from June
2007.2 With Internet penetration passing seventy percent of the United States
population in 2007, 3 more consumers are choosing to work and play online,
using Internet technologies for such varied purposes as scientific research4 and
social networking.' Responding vigorously to this upward trend in usage, busi-
nesses in the United States spent $9.76 billion on online media advertising in
2006.6 Recently, these companies have contracted with online advertising
firms to pinpoint the users most likely to purchase products and services after
t J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank his parents, Richard and Clare Hotaling, and his sister,
Catherine, for their unwavering love and support. He would also like to thank Professor
Mary Leary, Natalie Rastin, Keith Sullivan, and Michael Hoeker for their contributions to
this article.
I DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 507 (2003).
2 Enid Bums, Active Home Internet Users by Country, July 2007, THE CLIcKZ NET-
WORK, Sept. 4, 2007, http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3626923.
3 IntemetWorldStats.com, United States of America: Internet Usage and Broadband
Usage Report, http://www.intemetworldstats.com/am/us.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
4 See, e.g., SETI@Home, http://setiathome.berkeley.edu (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
5 See, e.g. Facebook Home Page, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
6 ADVERTISING AGE, 2007 MARKETERS PROFILES YEARBOOK 8 (2007), available at
http://adage.com/images/random/lna2007.pdf.
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viewing online advertisements.7 Furthermore, these companies increasingly
choose to subsidize online profiling of customers by interest through Web-
browsing activity, utilizing a controversial technology known as behavioral
targeting ("BT").8
BT, as its name implies, is a method of tracking the online behavior of
Internet users in order to serve those consumers with advertising targeted to the
specific interests "expressed" through Web-browsing activity.9 One of the fast-
est growing segments of the online advertising industry, BT technology repre-
sents a generational leap in user tracking technology."0 Amid a recent wave of
consolidation within the industry, e-commerce leaders have brought BT tech-
nology into the mainstream with their acquisitions of prominent BT firms."
Nonetheless, while lauded by industry analysts as the next generation of online
advertising, 2 BT facilitates market growth at the expense of a larger individual
and societal interest: a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy on the Inter-
net for his personally identifiable information. 3
7 According to a Zogby Interactive poll conducted March 23-26, 2007, eighty-five
percent of respondents reported that "privacy of their personal information is important to
them as consumers." Zogby Poll: Most Americans Worry About Identity Theft,
http://www.zogby.com/NEWS/ReadNews.dbm?ID=1275 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008) [herein-
after Zogby Poll]. Behavior Targeting ("BT") falls within the larger category of "online
preference marketing," a term used by industry group Network Advertising Initiative
("NAI") in its filings with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). NAI, SELF-REGULATORY
PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE PREFERENCE MARKETING BY NETWORK ADVERTISERS 2 (2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/07/NAI%207-1/0%2OFinal.pdf.
8 Id.
9 See TRUEFFECT, WRITTEN COMMENTS SUBMITTED BY TRUEFFECT, FTC ToWN HALL
EHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: TRACKING, TARGETING & TECHNOLOGY 2 (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071019trueffect.pdf.
10 Joe Kutchera, How BT Can and Should Change the Industry, IMEDIA CONNECTION,
Aug. 31, 2007, http://www.imediaconnection.com/content/16408.asp. eMarketer, a market
research company, projects that investment in BT technology will grow from $350 million
in 2006 to $3.8 billion in 2011. Id.
I Louise Story, Consumer Advocates Seek a 'Do-Not-Track' List, NYTIMES.COM, Oct.
31, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/31/technology/3 1 cnd-privacy.html.
12 NAI WRITTEN COMMENTS FOR THE FTC's EHAVIORAL ADVERTISING TOWN HALL FO-
RUM 6-7 (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071019nai.pdf.
13 ARI SCHWARTZ ET AL., CONSUMER RIGHTS AND PROTECTIONS IN THE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING SECTOR 2 (2007), available at
http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20071031consumerprotectionsbehavioral.pdf ("The collection,
use, maintenance, and disclosure of personal and behavioral information for marketing pur-
poses is a threat to consumers' privacy rights."). As defined by the Children's Online Pri-
vacy Protection Act of 1998, "personal information" means:
individually identifiable information about an individual collected online, including-
(A) a first and last name;
(B) a home or other physical address including street name and name of a city or town;
(C) an e-mail address;
(D) a telephone number;
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Inadequately protected against private actors by state and federal statutes, as
well as common law tort remedies, a citizen's reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy for personally identifiable information faces a new challenge in BT, a
technology that purports to construct deep, long-term profiles of online user
behavior. 4 Although online advertising companies argue that they do not col-
lect personally identifiable information through the use of BT technology, re-
cent disclosures of supposedly non-personally identifiable data indicate how
easily such information may be linked together to form identifiable profiles of
particular individuals." By monitoring user behavior across different Web sites
and browsing sessions, BT firms threaten a citizen's right to online privacy,
failing to both adequately notify users and seek consent to track their Web ac-
tivity.
Acting independent of notice and consent under a theory of "implied" con-
sent, advertising companies that employ this technology have the ability to
harvest personally identifiable information without the knowledge of all but
the most Intemet-savvy consumer. 6 Enhanced by recent e-advertising consoli-
dation, the proliferation of BT across online advertising networks presents an
emerging and largely unseen threat to user privacy on the Internet. In light of
the industry's failure to effectively self-regulate this growing technology
through use of readily viewable "opt-in" mechanisms, 7 Congress should act to
(E) a Social Security number;
(F) any other identifier that the Commission determines permits the physical or online
contacting of a specific individual; or
(G) information concerning the child or the parents of that child that the website col-
lects online from the child and combines with an identifier described in this paragraph.
15 U.S.C. § 6501(8) (2000). Additionally, as BT technology may permit the identification of
individuals solely by collection of non-personally identifiable information, a coalition of
privacy groups has proposed expanding the definition of personally identifiable information
to include any information that can, "directly or indirectly ... permit a set of behaviors or
actions to be consistently associated with a particular individual or computer user, even if
the individual or computer user is never identified by name or other individual identifier."
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra at 13.
14 See generally COLLIN JACKSON, ANDREW BORTZ, DAN BONEH & JOHN C. MITCHELL,
PROTECTING BROWSER STATE FROM WEB PRIVACY ATTACKS 2006, available at
http://www.crypto.stanford.edu/sameorigin/sameorigin.pdf (defining single-session, multi-
session, and cooperative tracking); CTR. FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY & U.S. PUB. INTEREST
RESEARCH GROUP, COMPLAINT AND REQUEST FOR INQUIRY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF CON-
CERNING UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ONLINE MARKETING PRACTICES 6 (2006), available at
http://www.democraticmedia.org/files/pdf/FTCadprivacy.pdf [hereinafter CTR. FOR DIGITAL
DEMOCRACY] ("Even after visitors leave a particular site, a trail of digital bread crumbs
follows them.").
15 See Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL Searcher No.
4417749, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at A l (describing AOL's disclosure of user search data
and how such data could be used to locate specific individuals).
16 See discussion infra Part IV.
17 See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1-2.
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revise the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act ("COPPA")'8 and apply
baseline notice and consent requirements to all BT online.
This Comment examines the legal development of traditional notice and
consent requirements as applied to the collection of user information by the
online advertising industry. Part II provides an overview of BT, contrasting its
method of data collection and analysis with that of prior online advertising
technology. Part III introduces information privacy law as applied to private
actors, focusing on the statutory, regulatory, and common law response to un-
authorized collection of user information on the Internet. Part IV argues that
"sectional" privacy statutes, common-law tort remedies, and industry self-
regulation are currently inadequate in providing for a basic level of online user
privacy in the age of BT and e-advertising consolidation. Part V presents statu-
tory amendments that would effectively protect citizens' rights to notice and
consent on the Internet while enabling the online advertising industry to con-
tinue catering advertisements to users' demonstrated interests. Part V con-
cludes that although Congress is likely to pursue comprehensive legislative
action on Internet data privacy in the near future, it will seek to protect person-
ally identifiable information after, rather than before, online companies acquire
such information.
II. BEHAVIORAL TARGETING: AN EVOLUTIONARY STEP IN ONLINE
ADVERTISEMENT TARGETING TECHNOLOGY
A. E-Advertising in a "Web 1.0" World 9
Originally developed from a proprietary United States defense and govern-
ment research network known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency
Network, the Internet is comprised of a series of global, interconnected, gov-
ernmental and non-governmental networks that allow servers and personal
computers to share data across long distances.2" Opened to commercial use in
the late 1980s, the dynamic physical and digital infrastructure of the Internet
18 The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000).
19 "Web 1.0" is an industry term used to describe the concept of the World Wide Web
as a "platform" for interactive services accessed through use of a Web browser. The term is
widely used to refer collectively to Web marketing strategies undertaken by companies in
the 1990's until the "bursting of the dot-corn bubble" in 2000-2001. In contrast, "Web 2.0"
refers to companies' second generation strategies vis-A-vis the Web: strategies focused on
the use of Web "applications" such as Facebook, Wikipedia, YouTube, and weblogs. Tim
O'Reilly, What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next Generation of
Software, O'REILLY MEDIA (Sept. 30, 2005),
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/2005/09/30/what-is-web-20.html.
20 See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet (Dec. 10, 2003) available
at http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history/brief.shtml.
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facilitated the rise of the World Wide Web ("Web") in the early 1990's." An
interlinked text and document transmission system developed by researchers at
the European Organization for Nuclear Research, the Web gave companies the
means to connect with consumers at their home and office computers for the
first time.22
Spurred by the growth of Internet infrastructure and the feasibility of con-
ducting commerce through the Web, companies worldwide began to invest
heavily in online advertising. 3 These companies recognized the potential of
online advertising to drive up consumer demand for commercial products and
services.24 In contrast to other media, online advertising promised businesses
of all sizes the ability to reach prospective customers in a global, intercon-
nected marketplace. 2 Effectively segmenting the online consumer audience
into large, discernable blocks, the birth of online advertising permitted corpo-
rations to more efficiently target their audience, yielding higher revenues per
advertising dollar spent.26 With the exponential increase in the 1990's, Internet
service providers like America Online capitalized on their growing customer
base by selling advertising space, thereby facilitating businesses in their at-
tempts to more effectively target potential customers. 7
As for the technical aspects of this advertising revolution in the mid-to-late
1990's, businesses that sought to display their advertisements began the proc-
ess by contracting with online advertising companies such as DoubleClick,
Inc. 8 Acting as middlemen, DoubleClick and similar advertising companies
bridged the gap between businesses seeking to advertise and web hosting pro-
viders who provided the actual advertising space.29 After obtaining the adver-
tising space for use, online advertising companies aided their clients by acquir-
ing the advertisement, preparing it for service, and ultimately serving the ad-
21 Id.
22 European Organization for Nuclear Research, How the Web Began,
http://public.web.cern.ch/public/en/About/webstory-en.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
23 Letter from Michael Zaneis, Vice President, Public Policy, Interactive Adver. Bureau,
Inc., to Donald S. Clark, Sec'y, FTC (Oct. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/071019iab.pdf.
24 Id. ("Today, consumers enjoy the benefits of Internet advertising through the avail-
ability of free content and services online .... [T]he interaction among consumers, publish-
ers, and advertisers fuels the engine that drives the Internet.").
25 Id. at 3.
26 Id. at 2.
27 See Seth Schiesel, America Online Reports Operating Profit in Quarter, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1997, at D3 (noting that the company's advertising and marketing revenue almost
tripled from the previous year); see also Peter H. Lewis, On-Line Ads to Tempt the Hungry
Computer Nerd, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1994, at D4 (discussing McDonald's online advertis-
ing campaign to target Internet users with America Online).
28 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
29 Id. at 502.
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vertisement to the host Web site.3" Rather than serving advertisements in tex-
tual form, e-advertising firms most often served images that appeared at the top
of Web pages. These images are commonly known as display or "banner" ad-
vertisements.'
Having acquired their clients' banner advertisements and the virtual space in
which to present them, online advertising companies then faced the challenge
of determining which advertisements should be viewed with what Web pages.
On Web sites that dealt with limited industries or topics of interest; the answer
was simple: serve advertisements from companies whose products and services
correspond to those industries or interests. However, on more complex sites,
the answer was frequently less clear-cut, pushing e-advertising firms to seek
out user information as a means of more effectively targeting Web advertise-
ments. Utilizing "cookies,"32 first-generation online advertising companies like
DoubleClick sought to pick up the crumbs of information left behind by users
in three distinct ways: (1) "GET submissions," (2) "POST submissions," and
(3) "GIF" submissions."33
GET information is acquired as a result of user input into Web site search
fields.34 Cookies then record this input upon submission of the "query string."3
Similarly, POST information is obtained by a cookie file when users fill-out
"multiple blank fields on a webpage," such as what one would do when send-
ing an e-card or requesting an online newsletter. 36 Finally, GIF information is
registered in cookies when users navigate. and click on links or other objects,
recording what is commonly -referred to as clickstream data.33 Storing this in-
30 Id.
31 Id. at 502 n.6 ("Banner advertisements are so named because they generally resemble
flags or banners, in that they tend to be long and narrow and their width often spans a sig-
nificant part of a Web page."). Banner advertisements still constitute a sizeable percentage
of advertisements on the Web. They may appear in either static or animated form. David
Kesmodel, Brand Marketers Return to the Web, Driving New Growth in Display Ads,
WALL. ST. J., May 10, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBl14356904672010265.html
(describing the resurgence and evolution of display advertising).
32 Cookies are small text files "commonly used by Web sites to store useful informa-
tion such as usernames, passwords, and preferences." DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at
502-03; see also Jenna L. White, Comment, The Search for a Viable Cause of Action
Against Private Individuals Who Use Cookies to Obtain Personal Information, 55 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 653, 655-56 (2005) ("Per session cookies 'remain in volatile memory and
expire when the browser is closed or according to a set expiration time.' Persistent cook-
ies, on the other hand, 'resid[e] as a text file on the user's hard drive, usually in a folder
called Cookies."').
3' DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. ("GIF tags are the size of a single pixel and are invisible to users. Unseen, they
record the users' movements throughout the affiliated Web site, enabling [online advertising
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formation in cookie files on a user's hard drive, online advertising firms also
acquired other useful demographic data, including the user's general geo-
graphic location, Internet service provider, computer manufacturer, and Web
browser.38 Uploading and analyzing this assortment of data before placing ad-
vertisements on host Web pages, e-advertising firms sought to match users
with appropriate, pertinent advertisements while providing their customers
with optimal advertisement visibility.39
As successful as these early efforts were for companies ready- to invest in
Web marketing, the first generation of Web advertisements did not necessarily
reflect the interests of the consumer who viewed them." Reliant on the "spray
and pray" -approach, the first generation of advertisements largely corre-
sponded to the Web sites on which they were posted.4 Although e-advertising
firms could ensure that local users would be with local companies as a result of
the additional demographic information provided by cookie technology, they
could not promise their clients that consumers who viewed advertisements
would be interested in the-products or services offered. 2
For example, a user who visited the Washington Post's Web site to search
for recent job listings in the Washington, D.C. area may have been presented
with an advertisement regarding local brokerage services, or even an adver-
tisement encouraging the user to refinance with an area mortgage company.
While these advertisements may have been useful to high-income homeowners
seeking to ride the stock market boom or take advantage of low-interest rates,
they would have been of no use to many other consumers, such as low-income
apartment dwellers. Accordingly, many online advertisers reported. a "hit or
miss" experience with first-generation Web advertising in the 1990's.43 Never-
theless, even the unrefined character of first-generation online advertising
yielded a higher return on investment than more traditional media advertising,
companies] to learn what information the user sought and viewed."). As first-generation
technology, clickstream data originally obtained only basic data, such as "the type of com-
puter an individual used to access the Internet, the type of Internet browser utilized, and the
identification of each site or page visited." Daniel B. Garrie & Rebecca Wong, The Future
of Consumer Web Data: A European/US Perspective, 15 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 129, 131
(2007).
38 After placing the cookie file on the user's computer, online advertising companies
have the ability to access and update the file each time a user visits and is served an adver-
tisement on an affiliated Web site. See DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 504 n.12.
39 Id. at 504-05.
40 See Eileen Colkin, A Mixed Message Online, INFO.WEEK, Nov. 27, 2000,
http://www.informationweek.com/814/ads.htm.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Stephen Abram, Content and Technology Meet the Money at the Dance, INFO. TO-
DAY, Jan. 20, 2008, http://newsbreaks.infotoday.com/nbreader.asp?ArticlelD= 17881.
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thereby ensuring that resources would continue to flow into the improvement
of the e-advertising model."
B. E-Advertising in the Era of Behavioral Targeting
Buoyed by the high return on investment delivered and confident in the fu-
ture success of more closely targeted online advertising, businesses in the
United States have invested heavily in e-advertising firms since the latter half
of the 1990's.45 This investment, combined with the physical expansion of
Internet infrastructure and steady growth in user penetration, transformed
online advertising into a nearly ten billion dollar industry in the United States
by the end of 2006.46 With a growth rate of 17.3% year-over-year in measured
media spending, online advertising continues to reshape the playing field of the
wider advertising industry, drawing businesses that traditionally have restricted
their advertising budget to print and over-the-air media." As technological
developments and economies of scale lowered barriers to access and enhanced
users' experiences on the Web, e-advertising firms likewise improved the cali-
ber of online advertising services available to their corporate clients. Alongside
Web analytics and data mining, BT offers companies the highest return on in-
vestment for dollars spent on e-advertising-a value that is only diminished by
the controversial nature of BT's tracking technology.48
User-centric rather than site-centric, BT represents an evolutionary step in
the tracking technology employed by e-advertising firms. Whereas first-
generation online advertising relied largely on the content of a Web site to de-
termine which advertisements were displayed on the host site, BT allows ad-
vertising companies to serve advertisements based on the interests of the indi-
vidual browsing the site.49 While cookie technology employed by first-
generation advertisement publishers allowed monitoring of general demo-
graphic information such as geographic location and computer type, BT per-
mits e-advertising firms to evaluate consumer attitudes based on the larger
whole of an individual user's Web activity.5" As Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer
44 Colkin, supra note 40.
45 CTR. FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 1-2.
46 ADVERTISING AGE, supra note 6, at 7.
47 See id.
48 See CTR. FOR DIGITAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 14, at 9-10.
49 Id. at 9. "As BlueLithium founder Gurbaksh Chahal declared in reference to the
power of Web analysis and personalized advertising, 'The more we see you, the more we
know about you."' Id.
50 See discussion supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
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noted before the Association of National Advertisers, "[t]he more we know
about customer behavior, the more every ad is relevant."'"
An amorphous title at best, BT is a term of art used by the e-advertising in-
dustry to categorize its diverse efforts to serve advertisements that respond to
the demonstrated interests of individual consumers. 2 Given the highly com-
petitive nature of the industry, online advertisers are protective of the algo-
rithms and systems technology behind their BT methods. Though this protec-
tive stance makes it difficult for consumers to discover the full extent of BT
technology practices, most firms that conduct BT subscribe to a common
method of pinpointing and categorizing user activity." Online advertisers ef-
fectively and efficiently target consumers through BT by acquiring user post-
ings and clickstream data, analyzing that data to form comprehensive personal
profiles, and serving Web advertisements that best match the interests ex-
pressed by those profiles. 4
In particular, the BT system developed by independent e-advertising firm
Revenue Science focuses on three main elements: a wide network of client and
affiliate Web sites designed to track users' Web behavior, segmentation of
tracked users' history into discernable categories, and efficient presentation of
online advertisements as users move across different Web sites." First, by
monitoring activity on the Web sites of its clients and affiliates, Revenue Sci-
ence advertises that it is able to track "billions of behaviors per day from more
than 100 million unique Internet users,"56 Putting aside the merits of such a
claim, the success of Revenue Science's BT efforts relies heavily on the com-
pany's ability to follow individuals over time as they move across the Web,
thus developing the widest possible sample of user behavior. In the absence of
a wide sample, Revenue Science and similar companies fall victim to the same
limitations of "Web 1.0": inadequate user data and context upon which to
judge consumer interests. 7
51 Stuart Elliott, 1,200 Marketers Can't Be Wrong: The Future Is in Consumer Behav-
ior, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2007, at C8.
52 Story, supra note 11.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Revenue Science, Privacy Policy, http://www.revenuescience.com/privacy.asp (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008).
56 The Revenue Science Difference,
http://www.revenuescience.com/publishers/revenue science difference.asp (last visited
Apr. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Why Revenue Science?]. Tracking the online behavior of con-
sumers over time and as they move across the Web, Revenue Science states that it "do[es]
not collect personally identifiable information." Revenue Science, Privacy Policy, supra
note 55.
57 See discussion supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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Acquiring the maximum amount of data on users from client and affiliate
Web sites, Revenue Science promotes its company's success at classifying user
activity within a series of distinct segments, each segment representing a dif-
ferent, discernable consumer interest." For instance, under the general topic of
auto, the company creates three distinct segments: "Auto Enthusiasts," "Hybrid
Car Shoppers," and "European Import Buyers." 9 From a marketing perspec-
tive, BT presents an effective means for companies to locate their target audi-
ence and restrict the majority of advertisement spending to that specific audi-
ence.
Having identified the behavior of online users and divided their Web activ-
ity into discemable segments, Revenue Science depends on its network of cli-
ent and affiliate Web sites as a means of publishing behaviorally targeted ad-
vertisements. According to Revenue Science CEO Bill Gossman, the company
has "lined up 3,000 sites that will take its ads," placing it slightly behind indus-
try leader TACODA but ahead of newer, less established competitors.6" With
the notable exception of perennial online advertising leader DoubleClick,
Revenue Science and TACODA's ability to place advertisements on a diverse,
widespread set of Web sites differentiates BT firms from advertising compa-
nies in the "Web 1.0" era. Many of those firms "couldn't easily buy space on
enough Web sites to make targeting truly effective."'" Using its network of
advertisement publishing sites for additional tracking of online consumers,
Revenue Science and its competitors attempt to create a cycle of BT that seeks
to attract satisfied consumers back into the system once they have made a pur-
chase from a BT client company. As for the level of consumer receptiveness to
BT, a recent study conducted by JupiterResearch found that consumers were at
least ten percent more receptive to behaviorally targeted advertisements than to
contextually targeted advertisements. 2
58 Revenue Science, Advertiser Solutions,
http://www.revenuescience.com/advertisers/advertiser-solutions.asp (last visited Apr. 6,
2008). Segments are "unique groups of users that are created using Client-defined criteria
that enable the Client to selectively serve targeted advertisements and otherwise profile
users of that Client's site(s) or advertisements." Revenue Science, Privacy Policy, supra
note 55.
59 Revenue Science, Advertiser Solutions, supra note 58.
60 Emily Steel, The Advertising Report: How Targeting Ads At Web Users Habits is
Shaping Industry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2007, at B5A.
61 Id.
62 Tameka Kee, Revenue Science Finds BT Ads 22% More Effective, MEDIAPOST PUB-
LICATIONS, Sept. 12, 2007, available at
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticleHomePage&a
rt_aid=67293. Contextually-targeted advertisements are those that specifically reflect the
content visited on a Web page, rather than the interests of the individual using the Web
page. Id
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Developed and refined by firms like Revenue Science, BT technology enters
the mainstream of online advertising on the heels of major consolidation be-
tween e-commerce leaders and BT firms. Within the last six months, four of
the largest e-commerce companies, Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and AOL,63
have purchased four of the most prominent BT firms: DoubleClick, BlueLith-
ium, aQuantive, and TACODA, respectively.64 This wave of consolidation
places these four companies at the top of the online advertising marketplace
while enabling each to fully integrate BT technology into its advertisement
tracking systems. In the case of Google's acquisition of DoubleClick, a deal
recently approved by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or "Commis-
sion"), the world's largest and most popular search engine will soon be inte-
grated with services from the world's largest online advertising firm6 5 Reflect-
ing the enthusiasm for increased user tracking expressed in no small way by
these major acquisitions, spending on BT is projected to increase dramatically
from $350 million in 2006 to $3.8 billion by 201 166
For Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and AOL, tracking the online activity of
Internet users through BT is a means to one end: higher advertising revenues.67
By acquiring prominent BT firms, these companies have voiced their support
not only for the high return on investment that companies experience with BT
technology, but also for the premium rates that BT firms have successfully
63 AOL is a majority-owned subsidiary of Time Warner, Inc. Press Release, Time War-
ner, Inc., AOL Realigns Business, Unveils Global Integrated Advertising Platform, (Sept.
17, 2007), available at http://www.timewamer.com/corp/print/0,20858,1662789,00.html.
64 Gavin O'Malley, AOL Finalizes TACODA Acquisition, MEDIAPOST PUBLICATIONS,
Sept. 7, 2007, available at
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticleHomePage&a
rt aid=67050.
65 See Electronic Privacy Information Center ("EPIC"), In re Google, Inc., and Double-
Click, Inc., Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investigation and for Other
Relief 30 (Apr. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/epic-complaint.pdf [hereinafter EPIC Complaint].
66 Michael Estrin, With TACODA in Tow, Will AOL Dominate?, IMEDIA CONNECTION,
July 25, 2007, http://www.imediaconnection.com/newsletter/15952.asp. Accounting for the
major acquisitions by Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and AOL, "the total value of merger activ-
ity in [the online advertising] industry exceeds $30 billion dollars so far." An Examination
of the Google-DoubleClick Merger and the Online Advertising Industry-What Are the
Risks for Competition and Privacy?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competi-
tion Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Kohl, Chairman, Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competi-
tion Policy and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=2955.
67 Saul Hansell, Which Advertiser Is on Your Friend List,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/02/which-advertiser-is-on-your-friend-list/ (Nov. 2,
2007, 16:57 EST) ("Yahoo, Microsoft, AOL and a host of small companies are all trying to
build advertising networks on the premise they can charge higher prices than Google be-
cause they have better ways to put the right advertisement in front of the right customer.").
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charged their customers over the past five years.68 Hoping to charge high rates
for their targeting services, these industry leaders elevate BT as one of the
principal means of transitioning e-commerce away from a subscription-based
model revenue towards an advertising-based model. 69 AOL's recent decision to
move its headquarters to New York and phase out its proprietary subscription-
based service is a harbinger of this shift in e-commerce strategy. 70 In the words
of its CEO Randy Falco, "the best way to serve advertisers is to enable them to
harness massive advertising networks that reach across the entire Internet, not
just... AOL websites." 7'
Not surprisingly, the convergence of enhanced BT capabilities and massive
consolidation between the e-commerce and online advertising industries has
been a significant cause for concern among consumer and privacy advocates.
In response to Google's move to acquire DoubleClick, the Electronic Privacy
Information Center ("EPIC"), U.S. Public Interest Research Group, and the
Center for Digital Democracy filed a joint complaint with the FTC.7" The com-
plaint alleged that "the increasing collection of personal information of Internet
users by Internet advertisers poses far-reaching privacy concerns that the Com-
mission should address."73 It also urged the FTC to grant an injunction halting
the acquisition until the Commission has time to investigate privacy conse-
quences and require Google to "present a public plan for how it plans to com-
ply with . . . well established government and industry privacy standards."74
Arguing that the complaint was "unsupported by the facts and the law,"75
Google nonetheless faced further scrutiny by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
which held a subcommittee hearing to examine the "risks for competition and
privacy" resulting from the proposed acquisition.76
Addressing the issue of privacy only tangentially in its final review, the FTC
chose to approve the Google/DoubleClick consolidation on December 20,
2007 by a vote of four to one.77 Effectively dismissing the privacy groups'
68 Robyn Greenspan, Behavioral Targeting Study Reveals CPM Lift, CLIcKZ NETWORK
Aug. 17, 2004, http://www.clickz.com/showPage.html?page=3396431.
69 See Michael Rappa, Business Models on the Web,
http://digitalenterprise.org/models/models.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
70 Press Release, Time Warner, Inc., supra note 63.
71 Id.
72 Joseph Menn, Google Plan Raises Privacy Issue: The Search Giant Wants to Com-
bine its Data With That of DoubleClick After it Buys the Ad Firm, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2007, at C I.
73 EPIC Complaint, supra note 65 1.
74 Id. 57.
75 Grant Gross, Privacy Groups: Google 's Call for Standard Not Enough, MACWORLD,
Sept. 17, 2007, available at http://www.macworld.com/article/60075/2007/09/privacy.html.
76 Hearing, supra note 66.
77 Google/DoubleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170, Statement of Federal Trade Com-
mission (Dec. 20, 2007), available at
[Vol. 16
Behavioral Targeting
complaint, the majority concluded that the FTC could only evaluate the com-
bination on antitrust grounds, such that "privacy considerations ... do not pro-
vide a basis to challenge [the] transaction."78 In a strong dissent, Commissioner
Harbour responded by noting that "[t]raditional competition analysis of
Google's acquisition of DoubleClick fails to capture the interests of all the
relevant parties," particularly the privacy interests of individual consumers.79
Consistent with the FTC's past reluctance to push for regulation of online pri-
vacy, the Commission chose to issue a set of "self-regulatory principles" for
those companies engaging in BT.8" Amounting to little more than a non-
binding policy statement, the principles have no legal effect on the use of BT
technology by the online advertising industry.
11. AN OVERVIEW OF INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
As the final FTC vote on Google/DoubleClick was undoubtedly influenced
by public and ex parte arguments put forward by privacy advocates and indus-
try lawyers, comprehension of these arguments requires one to examine the
fundamentals of information privacy law as enforced against private actors.
The sections below dissect the development of information privacy law in the
United States into four distinct stages: (1) common law; (2) Constitutional; (3)
statutory; and (4) Notice and Consent.
A. The Common Law Right to Privacy as Enforced Against Private Actors
Viewed by many legal commentators to be the "most influential law review
article of all,"81 The Right to Privacy by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
stands for the proposition that the common law must protect an individual's
"right to be let alone" from intrusion by private actors within the "sacred pre-
cincts of private and domestic life."82 Reasoning that "[r]ecent inventions and
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220statement.pdf [hereinafter Majority State-
ment].
78 Id. at 3.
71 Google/DoubleClick, F.T.C. File No. 071-0170, Dissenting Statement of Commis-
sioner Pamela Jones Harbour 10 (Dec. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/071220harbour.pdf [hereinafter Harbour Statement].
80 FTC, ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING: MOVING THE DISCUSSION FORWARD TO POS-
SIBLE SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/12/P859900stmt.pdf.
81 SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 1, at 3.
82 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 193-
95 (1890). Justice Brandeis argued that "the right to be let alone" should be enforceable
against the state, such that "to protect, that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the gov-
ernment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
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business methods" such as "instantaneous photographs," "newspaper enter-
prise," and "numerous mechanical devices" facilitate intrusion upon privacy,
Warren and Brandeis argue that the common law must respond to develop-
ments in technology that erode the individual's "full protection in person and
property" under the law.83
Although they did not go so far as to argue that the right to privacy is abso-
lute, the authors suggested that some remedy is necessary to redress this public
"evil."84 As a harmful act committed upon the "feelings" of a person, an inva-
sion of privacy cannot, in their view, be protected by an implied claim in con-
tract or property, but must be regarded as a tortious act entitling one to dam-
ages or injunctive relief.85
Responding to Warren and Brandeis' foundational article, state court judges
initially questioned the wisdom of creating new "privacy" torts. They argued
that public disclosure of private or patently inaccurate information is covered
by the torts of slander and libel, and that acts committed upon "feelings" could
be remedied by a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.86 How-
ever, by 1960, the majority of states had adopted Warren and Brandeis' rec-
ommendations, thereby enabling law professor William Prosser to classify four
discrete privacy torts: public disclosure of private facts; intrusion upon seclu-
sion; false light; and appropriation.87 With the exception of appropriation, a
plaintiff must meet a high burden of proof by demonstrating that the invasion
of privacy would be "highly offensive to a reasonable person."88
B. The Constitutional Right to Privacy as Enforced Against Private Actors
In addition to questioning the need for protecting privacy through the com-
mon law tort system, courts also struggled with whether the right to privacy is
a fundamental right to be protected against private actors. Beginning with
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court has recognized the right to pri-
vacy against state and federal government as a "penumbra" that is "created by
several fundamental constitutional guarantees" implicit in the Third, Fourth,
(Warren, J., dissenting).
83 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 82, at 193, 195.
84 Id. at 198-99.
85 Id. at 213.
86 Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law--Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327-28, 339-40 (1966). Persons may proceed with a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress when one "by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 46 (1977).
87 SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 1, at 18.
88 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652(B), (D), (E).
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and Fifth Amendments.89 In sharp contrast, however, the Court has resisted all
attempts to create a constitutional right to privacy enforceable against private
actors.
Examining this issue directly in United States v. Miller, the Court held that
personal financial records in the possession of third parties exist outside the
"zone of privacy" and are not subject to constitutional protection.9" Writing for
the majority, Justice Powell rebuked the lower court's judgment that the
documents themselves were "private papers" subject to protection under the
Fourth Amendment and the Court's ruling in Boyd v. United States.9' Perceiv-
ing no legitimate expectation of privacy in records that an individual willingly
made available to his bank, the majority declared that "the depositor takes the
risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed
by that person to the Government."92 Even as the majority conceded that the
"information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a lim-
ited purpose," Justice Powell cited Congress's intent in passing the Bank Se-
crecy Act of 1970, which provided that records be preserved for, among other
things, criminal prosecutions.93
Dissenting from the Court's decision in Miller, Justice Brennan quoted ap-
provingly and at length from a factually similar case in the Court for the
proposition that a customer has a legitimate expectation of privacy in informa-
tion given to a bank "in the course of his business operations."94 Picking up on
the "limited purpose" argument that the majority in Miller did not find persua-
sive, the California Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior Court held that the
bank customer in question had a reasonable expectation that "absent compul-
sion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized by the
bank only for internal banking purposes."95 The court reached its unanimous
decision based on Art I, § 13 of the California Constitution, a provision nearly
identical to the Fourth Amendment.96 Although Justice Brennan's opinion did
not find much support from the other members of the Court, the reasoning be-
hind his dissenting opinion became highly influential in Congress' efforts to
protect an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy in various forms of
personally identifiable information.
89 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965).
90 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440 (1976).
91 Id. at 439 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886)).
92 Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
93 Id. at 443-44.
94 Id. at 448 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
95 Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 529 P.2d 590, 593 (Cal. 1974).
96 Id. at 592-93; compare C.A. CONST. art I, § 13, and U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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C. The Federal Statutory Response to Invasions of Privacy as Enforced
Against Private Actors
Responding directly to the Supreme Court's rejection of a limited constitu-
tional right to privacy in financial documents, Congress enacted the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 ("RFPA").97 Validating Justice Brennan's dis-
sent, RFPA requires that absent legal compulsion in the form of a judicially
granted subpoena or search warrant, banks and other financial institutions can-
not disclose an individual's personal financial information.98 Though this law
functions only as a stop-gap in prohibiting such institutions from volunteering
customer information to the government, Congress's statutory design in pass-
ing RFPA is typical of their limited response to violations of privacy by private
actors over the past forty years.99
In contrast to the attention paid to violations of individual privacy by the
government in their collection and maintenance of personally identifiable in-
formation, Congress adopted a "sectoral" approach to protecting personally
identifiable information collected by private persons as well as private enti-
ties.'" For instance, in the area of personally identifiable financial information,
RFPA supplements consumer privacy protections included in the Bank Secrecy
Act of 1970,1 the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970,1°2 and the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act.'°3
Affording the most comprehensive protection of personally identifiable in-
formation of any federal statutes applied against private actors, this set of laws
responds directly to the Supreme Court's reluctance to enforce a right to pri-
vacy for personal information held by non-governmental institutions."° For
instance, under current law, credit-reporting agencies are required, upon notifi-
cation by the consumer, to release to his custody-with limited exceptions-
"[a]ll information in the consumer's file at the time of the request."'0 5 Having
received the information on file, the consumer is equally entitled to dispute
"the completeness or accuracy of any item of information" therein, a request
that "the agency shall reinvestigate free of charge.""
97 Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, tit. XI, 92 Stat. 3697 (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (2000)).
98 Id. §§ 3403, 3406-07.
99 SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 1, at 563.
100 Id. The sectoral approach is described as an approach in which "each statute ad-
dresses a particular industry or type of record or problem." Id.
101 Bank Secrecy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114.
102 Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2000).
103 Financial Services Modernization Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§6801-09
(2000).
104 SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 1, at 530-31.
105 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1).
106 Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A).
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Federal financial privacy statutes provide individuals with the right to bring
suit if a private actor discloses financial information in a manner proscribed by
law, but they do not go so far as to institute criminal liability for malfeasance
by private individuals or institutions."7 However, in light of the rapid devel-
opment of computer and other communications technology in the late 1980s,
Congress chose to institute stricter civil and criminal penalties for violations of
privacy that involve intentional interception of communications in transit or
unauthorized access to stored communications. Comprising Title I and Title II
of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA"), 118 the Wire-
tap Act" 9 and Stored Communications Act"' dramatically widen the scope of
federal privacy law as enforced against private actors.
Nonetheless, plaintiffs and prosecutors face high burdens of proof in order
to demonstrate civil or criminal liability under the ECPA. For example, under
the Wiretap Act, intentional interceptions by persons not acting under color of
law escape liability if done with the "prior consent" of one party to the transac-
tion, unless the communication is acquired "for the purpose of committing any
criminal or tortious act.""' Allowing defendants the statutory exception of con-
sent to any intentional interception, this provision legitimizes any interception
that is not done in furtherance of a crime or tort."2 Likewise, the Stored Com-
munications Act extends a defense to those whose access to stored communi-
cations is authorized either by "the person or entity providing a wire or com-
munications service" or by "a user of that service with respect to a communica-
tion of or intended for that user.""' 3 By enacting these provisions, Congress
chose to highlight the erstwhile exception to civil liability under the ECPA:
consent.
D. Qualifying Notice and Consent: In re DoubleClick and In re Pharmatrak
Providing stiff penalties for invasion of privacy through use of computers
and other communications equipment, ECPA represents Congress' response to
privacy pitfalls that accompanied the great technological developments of the
1980s. However, in terms of its relevance to the Intemet-driven world of the
107 See SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 1, at 523, 525, 533-35 (identifying civil liabil-
ity under the Financial Credit Reporting Act and Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
'08 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848.
109 Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22 (2000) (containing prohibitions against intercept-
ing communications).
"10 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2000) (containing prohibitions
against accessing stored communications).
I I Id. § 2511(2)(c)-(d).
112 United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
113 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)-(c)(2).
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twenty-first century, ECPA has been held to be of little applicability to possi-
ble invasions of privacy by private companies engaging in e-commerce. Spe-
cifically, federal courts have refused to hold advertising companies civilly li-
able for invasions of privacy, instead finding in favor of defendants based on
ECPA's consent exceptions." 4
Focusing on multiple claims brought by a class of plaintiffs under Titles I
and II of ECPA, the court in DoubleClick reviewed and rejected each of the
plaintiffs' arguments for relief."5 DoubleClick, the largest Web advertising
firm in the world, admitted to placing cookie files on the plaintiffs' hard drives
that were linked to user profiles on its servers." 6 Accessing and editing the
cookie files in order to target the plaintiffs with advertising from DoubleClick-
affiliated Web sites, DoubleClick did not deny monitoring users' GET, POST,
and GIF submissions in order to facilitate such targeting.' Ultimately the
court agreed with DoubleClick that the conduct, however intrusive, fell under
statutory exceptions in Titles I and II of ECPA. 8
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Buchwald ruled that in accordance
with the Wiretap Act's exception for consent, DoubleClick's intentional inter-
ception of plaintiffs communication was done with the prior consent of Dou-
bleClick-affiliated Web sites and was not conducted for a "criminal or tortious
purpose.""' 9 With regards to the Title II claim, the court also held that the GET,
POST, and GIF submissions made from plaintiffs' computers fell under the
Stored Communications Act's exception for consent, as "they [were] 'intended
for' the DoubleClick-affiliated Web sites who have authorized DoubleClick's
access."
20
Broadly construing the consent exceptions in Titles I and II, Judge Buch-
wald inferred consent to DoubleClick's conduct from the contractual relation-
ship between DoubleClick and its affiliate Web sites. The court did so even
though the affiliates were not themselves parties to the plaintiffs' action. Title I
uses the language of "prior consent" rather than the "intended for" requirement
of Title II; nevertheless, Judge Buchwald, without comment, found that the
affiliates had given "sufficient consent to DoubleClick to intercept" the com-
114 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 507, 519 (S.D.N.Y 2001)
(granting motion to dismiss in favor of defendant DoubleClick on consent exceptions under
Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act); In re Pharmatrak Inc. Privacy Litig., 220 F.
Supp. 2d 4, 12-14 (D. Mass. 2002) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant
Pharmatrak on consent exceptions under the Wiretap Act and Stored Communications Act).
115 DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
116 Id. at 504-05.
117 Id. at 504.
118 Id. at519.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 513.
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munications."2 ' The court did not examine whether consent required the affili-
ates explicit authorization, but rather inferred consent as a product of the con-
tinuing business relationship between DoubleClick and its affiliates. '22
In an analogous factual situation, In re Pharmatrak, the court initially re-
jected similar claims brought forward by a class of plaintiffs under Titles I and
It of ECPA.'23 Alleging that defendant Pharmatrak, a Web-monitoring com-
pany, intentionally intercepted users' transmissions and illicitly accessed users'
stored communications, the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief such that Phar-
matrak would be unable to "collect and share this wrongfully obtained personal
and sensitive information." '24 Citing DoubleClick for the proposition that Web
advertising companies can escape liability under Titles I and I of ECPA if
they meet the requirements of section 251 1(2)(d) and respectively, 2701 (c), the
court determined that Pharmatrak satisfied both exceptions.'2 5 The plaintiffs
attempted to distinguish the pharmaceutical Web sites' consent to collection of
personally identifiable information from their consent to the Pharmatrak ser-
vice. However, the court, relying on DoubleClick, held that the contractual
relationship implied consent. 12
6
Evaluating on appeal whether explicit or implicit consent is required, the
First Circuit reversed the district court's decision, holding that Judge Tauro
made an error at law by failing to follow precedent on consent.' 27 The First
Circuit previously ruled that a statutory consent requirement "should not be
casually inferred" by the court, but should be more closely examined to deter-
mine whether explicit or implicit consent is required.' 21 Contrary to the district
court's reasoning, the First Circuit indicated that DoubleClick, despite its fac-
tual similarity, should not be cited for the rule that "a consent to interception
can be inferred from the mere purchase of a service, regardless of circum-
stances."' 29 Upholding plaintiffs argument that the pharmaceutical companies
did not consent to Pharmatrak's information collection, the court reasoned that
the "contractual relationship" interpretation undermined the larger intent of
ECPA: to protect users' personally identifiable information from illicit surveil-
lance by private parties. 30
121 Id. at 514.
122 Id.
123 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig. (Pharmatrak), 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 15 (D. Mass.
2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003).
124 Id. at 6.
125 Id. at 12-14.
126 Id.
127 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig. (Pharmatrak I), 329 F.3d 9, 20 (1 st Cir. 2003).
128 Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 117-18 (1st Cir. 1990).
129 Pharmatrak 11, 329 F.3d at 20.
130 Id. at 20-21.
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Additionally, the court reasoned that if Pharmatrak was to prevail on its
summary judgment motion under sections 2511 (2)(d) and 2701(c), "efforts by
one party to a contract to require that the privacy interests of those who elec-
tronically communicate with it be protected by the other party to the contract"
would be undermined. 3 ' Indicating that neither the pharmaceutical corpora-
tions nor the plaintiffs consented to Pharmatrak's conduct, Judge Lynch also
pointed out that the clients' Web sites did not provide notice that browsing
their sites signified implicit consent to collection of personally identifiable in-
formation.'32 Much to the contrary, the intention of Pharmatrak to remain "in-
visible" to users functioned as "deficient notice," invalidating any implied con-
sent agreement that existed between plaintiffs and the pharmaceutical compa-
nies by use of the latter's Web site.'33 Although Pharmatrak and its fellow de-
fendants were granted summary judgment on remand due to the district court's
finding that any data interceptions were unintentional, " 4 the First Circuit's rul-
ing set a clear standard of notice for online advertising companies to meet.
IV. BEHAVIORAL TARGETING: A TECHNOLOGY INVISIBLE TO
CONSUMER NOTICE AND CONSENT
Viewed in light of constitutional, statutory, and common law in the area of
information privacy, the emergence of BT as the most sought-after marketing
technology in online advertising directly threatens the privacy of Web users'
personally identifiable information. By monitoring user behavior in a manner
"invisible" to all but the most technologically adept user, BT technology in-
vades user privacy while escaping liability under federal data privacy statutes
and common law tort remedies.'35 In the process, online advertising firms ef-
fectively avoid any requirement that users be given notice and the ability to
consent before personally and non-personally identifiable information is col-
lected. The wide-scale adoption of BT technology by e-commerce leaders such
as Yahoo, Microsoft, and AOL greatly exacerbates this problem.'36 Although
only 33.8% of Web sites currently feature BT, e-advertising consolidation in-
131 Id. at 20.
132 Id. at21.
133 Id.
134 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 292 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (D. Mass. 2003).
135 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 504 (S.D.N.Y 2001)
("DoubleClick's targeting advertising process is invisible to the user"); see also discussion
infra Part IV.A.
136 Google has expressed its reluctance to embrace traditional BT technology, choosing
instead to focus its efforts on tracking user interests over contiguous series of Google
searches. Eric Auchard, Google Wary of Behavioral Targeting in Online Ads, REUTERS, July
31, 2007, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUSN3135052620070801 ?sp--true.
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tegrates BT technology into the world's largest online advertising networks,
greatly expanding the reach of user tracking mechanisms.'37
Performing a fair amount of online reading and shopping, the average Web
user utilizes the Web to conduct business, to seek leisure, and to stay in com-
munication with friends and colleagues from the convenience of a personal
computer. 3 ' In the course of "surfing" the Web to complete these tasks, the
average user submits information to search engines and subscription-based
Web sites while clicking on Web links that spark her interest. The average
Web user, in spite of her average skill level with Internet technology, is even
aware that her Web browsing activity may be tracked by non-governmental
institutions.'39 Nonetheless, when performing such activities, the average user
has no expectation that private entities will collect personally identifiable and
non-personally identifiable information from her browsing history, using both
to form a long-term profile of her interests.'4 In other words, the average Web
user has an affirmative expectation that she will not be behaviorally targeted
by private entities.
A. The Sectoral Failures of Current Statutory and Common Law
As documented extensively by privacy law experts, the "mosaic" of current
data privacy statutes and common law tort remedies have proven to be severely
limited in their ability to protect user privacy on the Web.'4' While financial
data enjoy substantial protection under the patchwork of financial privacy stat-
utes recently updated by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 43 online users' federal
recourse has been effectively limited to the use of the Wiretap Act,'43 the
137 Lynn Russo Whylly, Behind the Numbers: Can Behavioral Hit the Target?, MEDI-
APOST PUBLICATIONS, Aug. 29, 2007,
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticleHomePage&a
rt aid=65079.
138 JOSEPH TUROW, LAUREN FELDMAN & KIMBERLY MELTZER, OPEN TO EXPLOITATION:
AMERICAN SHOPPERS ONLINE AND OFFLINE 3-4 (2005), available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/Downloads/InformationAndSociety/Turow_
APPCReport WEBFINAL.pdf.
13 Id. at 3.
140 According to a Zogby Interactive poll, ninety-one percent of respondents reported
concern that "retailers, credit card companies, banks and other firms could sell their per-
sonal information for marketing purposes." Zogby Poll, supra note 7.
141 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFOR-
MATION AGE 56-60 (New York University Press 2004); SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note
1, at 563-66; Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the
U.S. Private Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 531, 551 (1995); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 1611, 1633-34.
142 Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-09
(2000).
143 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000).
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Stored Communications Act,""4 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.'45 To
the extent that federal courts have evaluated users' claims of privacy violations
by online advertising companies, the courts have found no liability on the part
of corporate defendants. 
4 6
Allowing e-advertising companies to escape liability under statutory excep-
tions, the First and Second Circuits have compelled advocates to seek remedies
elsewhere for violations of online privacy. In particular, EPIC and similar or-
ganizations have chosen to petition the FTC to investigate offending compa-
nies. "'47 Although the Commission's enabling act does not provide a direct
cause of action for users, FTC staff may pursue investigations and seek civil or
equitable penalties if a company is found to have engaged in "unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."' 48 The FTC has taken some
action to enforce notice and consent requirements in the area of spyware;"4
however, it has not yet pursued adjudicatory action against firms that conduct
BT without user authorization. " Additionally, while COPPA instructs the
FTC to require prior parental consent for collection of personal information
from children under the age of thirteen, the FTC so far has taken minimal ac-
tion against offending parties.''
The four common law tort remedies for invasion of privacy focus on re-
dressing discrete harms committed by distinct tortfeasors upon separate indi-
viduals, and apply only indirectly to privacy violations by online advertising
companies."' For instance, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion exists as a pro-
tection against the "intentional intrusion into one's 'solitude or seclusion' or
1' 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-11 (2000).
145 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000) (requiring plaintiffs to show, in the absence of physical
harm, economic loss up to $5,000 in value to one or more persons during any one-year pe-
riod, due to fraudulent activity conducted through use of a computer).
146 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 514 (S.D.N.Y 2001);
Pharmatrak 1, 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 12, 14 (D. Mass. 2002); In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy
Litig. (Pharmatrak I1), 292 F. Supp. 2d 263, 268 (D. Mass. 2003).
147 See EPIC Complaint, supra note 65.
148 FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000).
149 CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., APPLYING THE FTC's SPYWARE PRINCIPLES TO BE-
HAVIORAL ADVERTISING 1-3 (2007), available at
http://www.fic.gov/os/comments/behavioraladvertising/07101 9centerdemocracytech.pdf.
15o Id. at 1-2 (arguing that the FTC should apply principles used in the Commission's
spyware actions to companies that conduct unfair or deceptive acts or practices through
illicit use of BT technology).
151 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-06 (2000). "As of August 2006, the FTC had brought.., eleven
actions pursuant to the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act." Allyson Haynes, Online
Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over Personal Information?, III PENN ST. L.
REV. 587, 603-04 (2007). For an example of an action brought under COPPA, see In re
Bonzi Software, Inc., 2004 FTC LEXIS 206 (F.T.C. 2004).
152 SOLOVE, supra note 141, at 94 (referring to this view of privacy as the "invasion con-
ception"). Id.
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'private affairs or concerns' that 'would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person.""" This tort can only apply to specific collection of one user's infor-
mation through one instance of BT, making it highly unlikely that a reasonable
person would find such a collection to be "highly offensive."'54 Likewise, as
the "highly offensive" guideline is an element of the torts of public disclosure
of private facts and false light, it is improbable that the finder of fact would
find a singular disclosure under either to pass such a strict standard.' Indeed,
the collection or disclosure of user information through BT might only pass the
standard when considered in the aggregate as a large-scale intrusion upon the
privacy rights of "hundreds of actors over a long period of time."'5 6 However,
this broader view conflicts directly with the limited remedies afforded by the
common law tort system, a system geared towards redress for the individual
rather than protection of larger social rights and interests.'57
B. Industry Self-Regulation: An Inadequate Alternative
Operating without consumers' "knowledge [or] authorization," '158 BT tech-
nology undermines the ability of users to consent by failing to provide effec-
tive notice of its existence. As the First Circuit held in Pharmatrak, without
effective notice, users have no ability to consent to the collection of their per-
sonally identifiable information.'59 Significantly distinguishing its ruling from
DoubleClick, the First Circuit rejected the defendants' argument that mere use
of a Web site indicates consent to interception of personal information. 6 ° Opt-
ing for a more robust definition of consent, the First Circuit, unlike the court in
DoubleClick, was unwilling to compromise users' reasonable expectation of
privacy for their personally identifiable information on the Internet. Although
its decision did not go so far as to reject the use of implicit authorization in
online transactions, the First Circuit held as a matter of practice that courts
should not "casually" infer consent to interception of electronic communica-
tions by private parties."'6
153 Id. at 59 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(B) (1976)).
154 Id.
155 Id. at 62.
156 Id. at 59.
157 Idat 61.
158 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig. (Pharmatrak 1), 220 F. Supp. 2d 4, 6 (D. Mass.
2002).
159 In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litig. (Pharmatrak H), 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003).
160 Id. at 21.
161 Id. at 20.
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1. Privacy Policies
As the First Circuit has failed to affirm its holding in Pharmatrak and other
federal appellate courts have failed to adopt the reasoning therein, e-
advertising firms continue to follow the loose standard with regard to notice
and consent set forth in DoubleClick.62 Nonetheless, conscious of users' pri-
vacy concerns, online advertising companies and e-commerce companies have
sought to reduce any potential liability by posting privacy policies on their
Web sites. 63 Most commonly accessed through a Web link on the home page,
privacy policies permit companies to inform consumers of the company's posi-
tion on the collection and use of online user data. For BT firms like Revenue
Science, a privacy policy serves as a means of informing consumers that their
browsing activity, as conducted on client and affiliate Web sites, is monitored
and analyzed by the firm's computers and technicians.
Full of "electronic boilerplate," privacy policies are written in the form of
contracts between companies and end-users, most often including a clause that
reserves the company the right to change its user data standards at any time.'
Nonetheless, these policies differ significantly from the traditional "clickwrap"
end-user license agreements that users encounter upon installing software or
signing up for online services. 65 In the case of a clickwrap agreement, the user
is prompted by the computer to read through a proposed agreement that the
user may assent to by clicking through the prompt. Having been given actual
notice of the company's terms of use, the user must affirmatively indicate his
consent in order to access the installation or service in question. In sharp con-
trast, Web site privacy policies neither prompt users to read the company's
privacy standards nor demand that they consent to such standards to continue
using the Web site.
Much to the contrary, privacy policies function as passive statements of in-
tent: promises made by the company to act in a certain manner with respect to
consumer Web data. Moreover, in the company's view, these promises do not
request nor require the user's consent but stand together as an "offer" that the
user is free to accept or reject. Under the "browsewrap" theory put forward
162 See discussion supra Part III.D.
163 The rise of online commerce since the late 1990's has made privacy policies perva-
sive on the Internet such that "it is rare" to see a Web site without one. Haynes, supra note
151, at 593-94.
164 Wayne R. Barnes, Rethinking Spyware: Questioning the Propriety of Contractual
Consent to Online Surveillance, 39 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1545, 1604 (2006). For an example
of a privacy policy's "reserved rights" clause, see Revenue Science, Privacy Policy, supra
note 55.
165 See, e.g., Gmail Home Page, http://www.gmail.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2008) (fol-
low "Sign Up for Gmail" hyperlink); Facebook Home Page, supra note 5 (follow "Sign Up"
hyperlink).
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here, the user manifests acceptance of the offer by continuing to use the Web
site, and manifests rejection by leaving the Web site or closing the browsing
window.'66 Continued use thereby forms a contract between the company and
its visitor. However, the mere presence of privacy policies on a company's
Web site fails to provide clear and convincing evidence that the user has actu-
ally consented to the terms of the offer.'67 State and federal courts have been
reluctant to uphold online privacy policies unless the user has "clicked [his]
acceptance" or has "actual notice of the terms."'68
Bearing in mind the average or even minimal technical skill of many Inter-
net users, it is a reasonable premise that many people use the Web without ever
viewing a "browsewrap" privacy policy. 69 Most often accessed by a small,
textual link at the bottom of a company's home page, privacy policies fail to be
readily apparent unless the user knows where to find them. 7 ' Indeed, if a user
chooses not to scroll to the bottom of the home page, it is unlikely that he or
she will even view the link to the specific policy. As the legal theory of
"browsewrap" privacy policy relies upon the user obtaining actual notice of the
policy's terms, the difficulty of gaining access to the policy's Web page acts as
a significant barrier to the user's ability to accept or reject the company's pri-
vacy "offer." While the company might argue that the visitor's continued use
functions as implied consent, such reasoning ignores the Pharmatrak rule that
"[d]eficient notice will almost always defeat a claim of implied consent. '
Content with following the DoubleClick standard of "casually" implied con-
sent, BT firms take "deficient notice" one step further by failing to require that
affiliate and client Web sites disclose their contractual relationship with the
firm. For example, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. ("ABC") contracts
with Revenue Science to provide for BT on its news site, ABCNews.com.'72
166 Haynes, supra note 151, at 590.
167 Id. at 615-18.
168 Id. at 613-14; see, e.g., I.Lan Sys., Inc. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp.
2d 328 (D. Mass. 2005); Net2Phone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 135 Cal Rptr. 2d 149 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003).
169 According to a Zogby Interactive poll, thirty-two percent of respondents reported that
"they sometimes read privacy policies," twenty-four percent reported that they "read them
most of the time," and only seven percent reported that they "always" read such policies.
Zogby Poll, supra note 7.
170 A brief survey of the home pages of Google, Yahoo, Microsoft, and AOL illustrates
that each links to its privacy policy via a small, textual hyperlink at the bottom of the home
page. E.g., AOL Home Page, http://www.aol.com (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). Google re-
quires users to click through two links to access its privacy policy. See Google Home Page,
http://www.google.com (follow "About Google" hyperlink; then follow "Privacy Policy"
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
171 In re Pharmatrak (Pharmatrak 1l), 329 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2003).
172 Revenue Science, Publisher Partners,
http://revenuescience.com/publishers/partners.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
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However, a review of ABC's online privacy policy demonstrates that the com-
pany does not specifically disclose its contractual relationship with Revenue
Science, nor the fact that Revenue Science performs BT on individuals who
browse ABCNews.com.'73 Instead, the user is given a vague warning that use
of "technical methods may enable [ABC] to collect and use information in a
form that is personally identifiable."' 74 Choosing not to fully disclose their re-
lationship with third party e-advertising firms, ABC fails to provide consumers
actual notice that their activity on ABCNews.com is behaviorally targeted.
Without adequate notice users have no opportunity, short of conducting their
own research, to consent to BT by e-advertising firms. 75
2. Opt-Out
In their defense, online advertising companies claim to offer a multitude of
options for users to "opt-out," that is, to indicate that they do not want their
information, personally identifiable or otherwise, collected for BT purposes.
Most often presented as an option within the company's privacy policy, opt-
out mechanisms enable users to prevent further tracking of their browsing his-
tory by several different methods: submitting an online form; sending an e-
mail request; or allowing an additional cookie file to be placed on the individ-
ual's hard disk.'76 While the first two methods are self-explanatory, the third
method prevents BT by reminding the advertising company's server (upon
querying) that the consumer has chosen to opt-out. 177
Despite its simplicity, the method of placing additional cookies on an indi-
vidual's hard drive suffers fatal flaws. First, it requires the user to permanently
maintain the opt-out cookie on his hard drive.' 78 If the user purposefully or ac-
cidentally deletes the cookie, he must visit the company's Web site and opt-out
again. Second, this method forces users who "change computers or browsers,
or use multiple computers or browsers ... to repeat this process for each com-
173 Privacy Policy for ABC, http://disney.go.com/corporate/privacy/pp abc.html (last
visited Apr. 6, 2008). In contrast, Time.com discloses its relationship with third party e-
advertising firms within its privacy policy. See TIME Privacy Policy,
http://www.timeinc.net/legallparties.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
174 Privacy Policy for ABC, supra note 173.
175 Pharmatrak I, 329 F.3d at 21.
176 See Revenue Science, Privacy Policy, supra note 55 (offering a cookie opt-out op-
tion); see also Advertising.com, Opt-out, http://www.advertising.com/opt out.php (offering
online form or e-mail request opt-out options) (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
177 REVENUE SCIENCE, INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPTING OUT OF THE REVENUE SCIENCE NET-
woRK 6 (2006), http://www.revenuescience.com/docs/nai.pdf.
178 Opt Out of NAI Member Ad Networks,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/optout.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
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puter and each browser." '79 For individuals who use a range of computers and
Web-capable devices every day, the process of maintaining such opt-out pro-
tection quickly becomes burdensome.
Nonetheless, even with its fundamental flaws, cookie technology constitutes
the foundation of the online advertising industry's minimal efforts at self-
regulation of consumer tracking technologies such as BT. Self-regulation arose
in direct response to the FTC's investigation of DoubleClick's acquisition of
Abacus Direct Corp. in June 1999.8' Pursuant to its statutory authority to
probe "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,"' 8 the
FTC sought to determine whether consumers' personally identifiable informa-
tion was used by DoubleClick for purposes other than those disclosed in its
privacy policy.'82
Although its investigation halted in January 2001,83 the FTC's involvement
spurred DoubleClick and other major e-advertising firms to join the Network
Advertising Initiative ("NAI"), an industry research group that purports to be
"a leading voice in the development of solutions to spam, spyware and other
online privacy threats."'84 NAI's Web site provides users with a centralized
location from which to register opt-out cookies that prevent continued tracking
by participating BT firms.'85 At a practical level, DoubleClick's decision to
join NAI allowed the company to temporarily mollify consumer advocates and
forestall any further investigation into its user monitoring practices.'86
179 TACODA's Privacy Policy, http://www.TACODA.com/notice/privacy-policy.html
(last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
180 In re DoubleClick, Inc., Complaint and Request for Injunction, Request for Investiga-
tion and for Other Relief (Feb. 10, 2000), available at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/DCLK-complaint.pdf.
181 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2000). The FTC is both "empowered" and "directed" to prevent
the use of unfair or deceptive acts. Id.
182 In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 505 n.14 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
183 Letter from Joel Winston, Acting Associate Director, Division of Financial Practices,
FTC to Christine Varney, Esq., Hogan & Hartson (Jan. 22, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/staff/doubleclick.pdf.
184 What is the NAI Doing to Help You Protect Your Privacy?,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
185 Opt Out of NAl Member Ad Networks, supra note 178.
186 See Press Release, FTC, Federal Trade Commission Issues Report on Online Profil-
ing: Commends Network Advertising Initiative's Self Regulatory Principles (July 27, 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/07/onlineprofiling.shtm ("The Commission
unanimously applauded the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) for developing an innova-
tive self-regulatory proposal which addresses the privacy concerns consumers have about
online profiling."). Consumer advocacy groups, however, were not assuaged by NAI's self-
regulatory proposal. See letter from Marc Rotenberg, Exec. Dir., EPIC, to the Senate Com-
merce Committee, United States Senate (July 28, 2000), available at
http://epic.org/privacy/internet/NAIletter.html ("[T]he proposal to sanction online profil-
ing, negotiated by the Federal Trade Commission with the Network Advertising Initiative..
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Functioning as an advocacy arm of the industry in opposition to the con-
sumer-focused privacy agenda put forward by EPIC and other organizations,
NAI presents self-regulation as a viable alternative to governmental regulation
of online advertising companies that engage in BT. Under the NAI Principles,
a so-called "ethical code for online preference marketing,"'87 NAI member
companies who engage in BT are required to post a notice on all Web sites that
are served by their networks. 8 According to NAI, this notice is required to
inform the user that "[t]he advertising networks may place a 3rd party cookie
on your computer" and that "[s]uch a cookie may be used to tailor content both
on the site you are visiting as well as other sites within that network" that the
user may visit at a later time. 89
Intended to fulfill the first two provisions of the FTC's "Fair Information
Practice Principles,"' 0 the NAI Principles in practice fall short of mandating
adequate notice of and user consent to BT. Using the prior example of AB-
CNews.com to illustrate this point, it is clear that ABC has failed to live up to
the FTC's notice-awareness requirement in its dealings with Revenue Science.
Under this requirement, "identification of the entity collecting the data" is an
"essential" component of notice.'' Although ABC's privacy policy does dis-
close that it contracts with "network advertisers" and provides a link to NAI's
Web site, ABC does not identify Revenue Science or any other network adver-
tiser as an entity collecting user data on ABCNews.com.'92 Therefore, while
one may visit the NAI site and opt-out of the eleven listed tracking networks,
the user possesses no means of identifying which specific companies have col-
lected data on him. Additionally, ABC's privacy policy refers to NAI members
as only "some" of the network advertisers that the company may contract
with,'93 leaving the user unaware of other companies that may conduct BT on
ABCNews.com.
• fails to provide adequate safeguards for Internet users and will encourage the development
of invasive data collection practices that threaten not only the privacy of American consum-
ers but also the health of the Internet economy.").
187 Letter from Joel Winston, supra note 183, at 2.
188 The NAI Principles: How They Help Protect Your Privacy,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/managing/principles.asp (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
189 Id.; see also NAI, supra note 12, at 1.
190 The FTC's Fair Information Practice Principles are derived from a list of five essen-
tial practices published in a United States Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare
report. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS,
AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 41-42 (1973).
191 FTC, Fair Information Practice Principles,
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/fairinfo.shtm (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
192 See Privacy Policy for ABC, supra note 173.
193 See id.
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Indeed, although NAI stands at the forefront of the online advertising indus-
try's efforts at self-regulation, the organization's authority only extends as far
as those companies that have chosen to agree to its stated principles. As previ-
ously noted, this includes eleven e-advertising firms, not all of whom necessar-
ily perform BT services.'94 While these firms comprise most of the established
leaders in online advertising, many BT firms have chosen to remain beyond the
scope of NAI's compliance program, maintaining their own privacy and con-
sumer opt-out procedures. For example, Omniture, a publicly-traded advertis-
ing company whose clients include "three of the top five Fortune-ranked com-
panies" and "nine of the top ten automotive Web sites," operates outside of the
NAI framework.'95 While its decision to institute separate procedures does not
necessarily indicate that such procedures provide less user protections than are
required by NAI, Omniture's independence in this matter indicates the relative
lack of influence the NAI Principles have within the industry as a whole.
3. Opt-In
Pushing an alternative to the self-regulated opt-out regime advocated by
online advertising companies like Revenue Science, privacy advocates argue
that notice and the user's ability to consent are better facilitated by a consumer
"opt-in" requirement.'96 In contrast to opt-out, which requires users to take af-
firmative steps (i.e., installing an opt-out cookie) to protect personally identifi-
able information, opt-in holds as a "default rule .. .that personal information
cannot be collected or used about an individual unless the individual provides
consent."' 97 Believing user privacy to be an individual right of wider societal
value, commentators advocate opt-in requirements as the most effective means
of preventing the unauthorized collection and use of user information on the
194 NAI, Participating Networks: Full Compliance Members,
http://www.networkadvertising.org/participating/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). With AOL's
acquisition of TACODA, Inc., this number is set to fall to ten, as TACODA's BT operations
will be combined with Advertising.com's advertisement-serving network under AOL's
newly integrated "Platform A." Press Release, Time Warner, Inc., supra note 63.
195 Omniture, Inc., A Market Leader, http://www.omniture.com/company (last visited
Apr. 19, 2008); see also NAI, Participating Networks: Full Compliance Members, supra
note 194 (indicating that Omniture is not an NAI participating network).
196 See SOLOVE, supra note 141, at 106; Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Op-
tions at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1118
(1999).
197 SOLOVE, supra note 141, at 106; see also Sovern, supra note 196, at 1118 (arguing
that notice and the user's ability to consent are better facilitated by a consumer "opt-in"
requirement); James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78
WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003) ("[lnformation privacy should be visited as a societal value justi-
fying a resolution in the public interest, much like environmental policy and other societal
concerns, with less emphasis on individual self-policing and market-based mechanisms.").
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Internet. 9' FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, speaking on the subject of BT at
a recent Commission workshop, endorsed this viewpoint, suggesting that
"more [privacy] policies should be opt-in."'09
Opt-in requirements remedy the most egregious inequality of the current
opt-out system: the disparity in knowledge between the average user and the
company collecting information." ° Within the realm of BT, this disparity takes
clearest form in the failure of company privacy policies to alert consumers to
the identity of contracted BT firns. Here, contracted BT firms have the ability
to behaviorally target specific users while users cannot determine which enti-
ties may be tracking their browsing habits. Without knowledge of the compa-
nies' identities, users have no means of correcting-the inequality and reassert-
ing some measure of control over their privacy on the Web.
Given the highly competitive nature of the online advertising marketplace,
e-advertising firms oppose transitioning from an opt-out self-regulatory system
to an opt-in regulatory regime.2' While opt-out mechanisms place the onus on
individuals to indicate their lack of consent, opt-in forces companies to take
affirmative steps to gain users' consent before acquiring information, steps the
industry views as unduly burdensome.2 "' Conceptualizing privacy as a property
right, e-advertising firms believe that users are willing to contract away their
privacy if companies deliver substantial benefits for doing so, such as in-
creased "personalization" of Web sites to user interests through BT.203
Online advertising companies posit that opt-in requirements would detract
from the move towards increased personalization, imposing significant transac-
tion costs on BT firms in the process.2 4 However, the application of cost-
benefit analysis to information privacy issues introduces a measure of incom-
parability to the debate over collection of personally identifiable information
198 SOLOVE, supra note 141, at 85, 105-06 ("There are too many collectors of informa-
tion for a right of opt-out to be effective. Without a centralized mechanism ... individuals
would have to spend much of their time guarding their privacy like a hawk."); see also
Nehf, supra note 197, at 5-7.
199 Louise Story, F.T.C. Member Vows Tighter Controls of Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ll/02/technology/001cnd-
ftc.html.
200 SOLOVE, supra note 141, at 106.
201 See, e.g., NAI, supra note 12, at 6-8 (explaining the benefits of behavioral advertis-
ing and the success of self-regulation).
202 See, e.g., Story, supra note 199 (quoting Randall Rothenberg, President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Interactive Advertising Bureau, as stating that federal opt-in regula-
tion would stifle an "extraordinary pattern of innovation" in the online advertising industry).
203 See Alana Semuels, Groups Fight Browser Tracking, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007, at
Cl.
204 See Story, supra note 199; see also Semuels, supra note 203 (quoting Ian Schafer,
chief executive of interactive marketing agency Deep Focus as stating that BT "can improve
a consumer's Internet experience").
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on the Web.2 °5 While privacy proponents have difficulty "identify[ing] and
quantify[ing] the costs of data proliferation or the benefits of data protec-
tion[s]" cost-benefit analysis allows companies to easily "identify and quantify
the costs of restricting data collection and sharing. '26 Put another way, cost-
benefit analysis stands as a suboptimal method of assigning set value to user
privacy on the Web.
Recognizing that the right to privacy as enforced against private actors is of
greater value to society than its market price might indicate, privacy advocates
argue that the "market can work well, but not in the absence of structural legal
protections.""2 7 Indeed, the lack of substantive legal protection of personally
identifiable information on the Web permits online advertising companies to
cut away at user privacy rights while allowing consumers no recourse in law or
equity. Failing to provide users effective notice and the ability to consent to
BT, these companies have "little incentive .. . to adopt strong privacy protec-
tion" in the absence of baseline federal regulation.0 0 In the age of BT and e-
advertising consolidation, Congress must act to provide the uniform online
privacy protections that prior federal statutes, state common law, and industry
self-regulation have failed to supply.
V. ENACTING A FEDERAL ONLINE PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT
Congress must substantially revise COPPA to ensure that all Internet users
have the right to affirmative notice and the ability to explicitly consent to BT
of their Web-browsing activity.2" As numerous legal commentators have ob-
served, there is currently no uniform federal regulatory system that governs
Web site operators' collection of personally identifiable information."0 By en-.
205 See James P. Nehf, Incomparability and the Passive Virtues of Ad Hoc Privacy Pol-
icy, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2005).
206 Id. at 3.
207 SOLOVE, supra note 141, at 91.
208 Id.
209 As Commissioner Jon Leibowitz asserted on November 1, 2007, "[p]eople should
have dominion over their computers ... The current 'don't ask, don't tell' in online tracking
and profiling has to end." Story, supra note 199.
210 lan Rambarran & Robert Hunt, Are Browse-Wrap Agreements All They are Wrapped
Up to Be?, 9 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173, 197 (2007). Under COPPA, an operator is
defined as:
[A]ny person who operates a website located on the Internet or an online service and
who collects or maintains personal information from or about the users of or visitors to
such website or online service, or on whose behalf such information is collected or
maintained, where such website or online service is operated for commercial purposes,
including any person offering products or services for sale through that website or
online service, involving commerce [where one party to the transaction is within the
United States or its territories].
15 U.S.C. § 6501(2)(A) (2000).
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acting a new Online Privacy Protection Act in place of COPPA, Congress
would validate users' reasonable expectation of privacy for their personal in-
formation on the Web while enabling e-advertising firms to continue BT with
the full knowledge and consent of users.
While advertising firms would likely argue that BT does not collect personal
information and would be exempt from new regulation, personal information
under COPPA includes "any other identifier that the [Federal Trade] Commis-
sion determines permits the physical or online contacting of a specific individ-
ual." '' As AOL recently learned when it disclosed data collected through user
monitoring technology to the public, even non-personally identifiable informa-
tion can be used to find individual users."' Tracking user interests through
their browsing habits, BT in particular assembles a broad profile of user activ-
ity, a profile that could conceivably "permit the physical or online contacting
of a specific individual." '
A. Revising the Scope of the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
Appropriating the regulatory framework of COPPA, legislators should
widen the scope of its legal applicability by removing statutory references to
children and parents. First, COPPA is only applicable to the "operator of any
web site or online service directed to children that collects personal informa-
tion from children ... or has actual knowledge" that it is doing so.24 A revised
act should apply more broadly to operators that collect personal information
from any individual. Second, whereas COPPA demands that the operator pro-
vide "verifiable parental consent for the collection, use, or disclosure of per-
sonal information from children,"2 '5 a new privacy act would simply command
consent from the individual whose information should be collected. Third,
whereas COPPA requires the operator to provide parents the opportunity to
opt-out of any "further use ... or future online collection" of a child's personal
information," 6 a revised act should allow the individual to choose whether to
opt-in to continued collection and use of personal information.
Making a distinction between the legal protections afforded to children and
to parents, the current law strikes a "paternalistic and authoritarian" stance to-
211 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8).
212 Barbaro & Zeller, Jr., supra note 15.
213 15 U.S.C. § 6501(8); see also Hearing, supra note 66 (statement of Sen. Leahy,
Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary) ("Although data is often accumulated anony-
mously, tracking a user's actions on the web can build profiles that may be linked with per-
sonally identifiable information.").
214 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
215 Id. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(ii).
216 Id. 6502(b)(l)(B)(i)-iii).
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wards online user privacy.2 7 The effectiveness of COPPA depends upon the
willingness of parents to supervise their children's online activities; a task that
quickly becomes "onerous" to both child and parent. 21 8 The statute itself at-
tempts to minimize parental involvement by designating circumstances where
prior parental consent is not required. These statutory exceptions become ef-
fective, for example, when "online contact information collected from a child
that is used only to respond directly on a one-time basis to a specific request
from the child," or when an operator collects "online contact information of a
parent or child that is used for the sole purpose of obtaining parental consent or
providing notice. '2 9 Although these exceptions reduce the number of instances
when parents must give consent, they simultaneously broaden the ability of
Web site operators to collect information without seeking user authorization.
When revising COPPA, Congress should limit statutory exceptions to in-
stances where information collection or use is necessary to "protect the secu-
rity or integrity of [a] Web site," to "take precautions against liability," "re-
spond to judicial process," or "provide information to law enforcement agen-
cies. '
B. Revising Notice and Consent Requirements in the Children's Online
Privacy Protection Act
Congress should also address the deficiencies in notice and consent within
the current system by requiring affirmative notice of and explicit consent to all
collection of personally identifiable information. At a basic level, this shift in
statutory language would obligate consumers to opt-in to collection rather than
opt-out from collection. 2 ' The first revision should command the operator of a
Web site or online service to provide affirmative "notice on the website of
what information is collected from ... [individuals] by the operator, how the
operator uses such information, and the operator's disclosure practices for such
information." '222 Forcing companies to alert users to their privacy policies, this
requirement would address the problem of deficient notice while preventing
users from ignoring such policies altogether.223 As a second step towards the
217 Anita L. Allen, Minor Distractions: Children, Privacy and E-Commerce, 38 HOUS-
TON L. REv. 751, 770-71 (2001) ("COPPA did what family law does. It conferred legal
power over children to parents or other adult guardians ... limit[ing] the ability of children
under the age of thirteen to disclose personally identifying information without the knowl-
edge and consent of their parents.").
218 Id. at 768-69.
219 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(2)(A)-(B).
220 Id. § 6502(b)(2)(E)(i)-(iv).
221 See SOLOVE, supra note 141, at 105-06 (contrasting opt-out and opt-in systems).
222 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i).
223 See discussion supra notes 134, 165-70 and accompanying text.
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abolition of deficient notice, Congress should amend COPPA to enforce af-
firmative notice of "which third party entities are authorized to collect informa-
tion on the website." '224 Specific disclosure of third parties would deliver users
actual knowledge of which online advertising firms engage in BT on individual
Web sites.
In addition, by requiring explicit consent to all collections of personally
identifiable information, Congress would eliminate the DoubleClick loophole
that has allowed e-advertising companies to collect user data under the
"browsewrap" theory of implicit consent.225 Specifically, an amendment to
COPPA should require that the operator "obtain verifiable consent for the col-
lection, use, or disclosure of personal information" from the individual whose
information would be collected.226 Exchanging the browsewrap (opt-out) the-
ory of implicit consent for a clickwrap (opt-in) theory of explicit consent, a
new Online Privacy Protection Act would empower the user to affirmatively
approve or disapprove of a Web site's data privacy standards.227 While online
advertising firms and their clients would complain that such regulation creates
prohibitive transaction costs, the technology exists in JavaScript and other Web
programming languages to easily prompt the user for his consent.228 Although
this does little to prevent users from clicking through the prompt, federal regu-
lation cannot force online users to read a given privacy policy. It can only re-
quire that users be able to explicitly agree or disagree with the policy.
C. The Prospects of Congressional Action on an Online Privacy Protection Act
Under Democratic control for the first time in eleven years, Congress will
likely pass new federal privacy legislation before the conclusion of its 1 10th
session. Generally friendly to the interests of privacy and consumer advocates,
the new congressional leadership has indicated a willingness to consider legis-
lation that would strengthen the consumer's hand in dealings with online com-
panies who collect personally identifiable user information.229 However, con-
cerned more immediately with the problem of identity theft in the wake of sev-
eral data breach scandals, Congress is unlikely to enact a bill that requires af-
224 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A)(i).
225 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 1.
226 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(l)(A)(ii).
227 See discussion supra notes 163-67 andaccompanying text.
228 See, e.g., Web Developers Notes, The JavaScript Prompt-Getting User Input,
http://www.webdevelopersnotes.com/tutorials/j avascript/javascriptpromptvisitor inputs.p
hp3 (last visited Apr. 6, 2008). Under an opt-in system, companies who seek to collect per-
sonally identifiable information would have a compelling interest to "make it as easy as
possible for consumers to consent to the use [of such information]." SOLOVE, supra note
141, at 106.
229 153 CONG. REC. S1628 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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firmative notice and explicit consent before collection of such data.23° Instead,
Congress will likely choose to pursue legislation mandating stricter regulatory
controls on the use and dissemination of personally identifiable information
online.
The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, introduced by Senate
Judiciary Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy and co-sponsored by five other
members of his committee, is one of several bills currently under consideration
by Congress."' The bill seeks to minimize unauthorized disclosures of person-
ally identifiable information by enacting civil penalties for those companies
that misuse or fail to adequately protect consumers' personal data.23 2 Enhanc-
ing criminal penalties for those individuals who knowingly commit or conceal
security breaches or identity theft, the act also requires businesses that keep ten
thousand or more records on United States persons to implement a mandatory
"Personal Data Privacy and Security Program." '233 Mirroring the Senate Judici-
ary Committee's action, the Senate Commerce and Banking Committees have
favorably reported two similar bills out of committee.3
While Congress is unlikely to consider legislation that would mandate af-
firmative notice and explicit consent, the Senate in particular has maintained a
close watch over consumer privacy issues involving the online advertising in-
dustry. In the context of a subcommittee hearing on the competition and pri-
vacy implications of the Google/DoubleClick combination, Senator Leahy as-
serted that "the potential for accumulation of vast amounts of personal viewing
data by online advertising providers raises significant privacy concerns. ' '235 As
a practical matter, Chairman Leahy and subcommittee Chairman Herbert
Kohl's special attention to this matter incentivizes the toughening of e-
advertising firms' user information practices. If the online advertising industry
seeks to avoid statutory requirements of notice and consent in the long term, it
must act to preempt congressional action.
In the near term, however, information collection practices will only be
strengthened by the threat of regulatory action by the FTC. While the Commis-
sion has not vigorously probed online advertising practices in the wake of its
DoubleClick investigation,236 the FTC signaled its continued observation of the
market by holding a two-day workshop entitled "Ehavioral Advertising: Track-
230 See id.
231 Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2007, S. 495, 110th Cong. (2007).
232 153 CONG. REc. S1628.
233 S. 495, §§ 101-02, 301.
234 Identity Theft Protection Act of 2007, S. 1178, 110th Cong. (2007); Data Security
Act of 2007, S. 1260, 110th Cong. (2007).
235 Hearing, supra note 66 (statement of Sen. Leahy, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary).
236 See discussion supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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ing, Targeting, and Technology." '237 In direct response to this workshop, AOL
and its new subsidiary, TACODA, announced their intent to serve "[b]anner
ads providing enhanced notice and choice" across their joint advertising net-
work.238 While AOL's shift is definitely a step in the right direction, the FTC's
reluctance to propose regulations or to pursue adjudicatory action provides
little incentive for e-advertising companies to change their information collec-
tion practices.
Choosing instead to propose a non-binding set of "principles" for BT on
December 20, 2007,239 the FTC appears willing to continue its support for in-
dustry self-regulation, a course that has consistently failed to protect consum-
ers' privacy rights. In line with the Commission's refusal to evaluate the
Google/DoubleClick combination on privacy grounds, 20 the issuance of prin-
ciples compels no positive action on the part of the industry, only further delay
on needed protection of online privacy rights. Consequently, in the absence of
sustained regulatory pressure as enforced by federal statute, consumers will
continue to experience BT without the benefit of effective notice and consent
requirements.24 '
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress must act to preserve consumers' privacy rights on the Web by
passing a new Online Privacy Protection Act. Currently, behavioral targeting
technology allows online advertising companies to acquire personally identifi-
able information without affirmative notice and explicit consent. A new online
privacy act would fulfill consumers' reasonable expectation of privacy on the
Web by requiring e-advertising firms to provide notice and secure consent be-
fore obtaining personally identifiable information. Finally, a new act would
apply only baseline opt-in requirements to the use of behavioral targeting tech-
237 FTC, Ehavioral Advertising: Tracking, Targeting, and Technology,
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/ehavioral/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2008).
238 Press Release, AOL, AOL Launches Innovative Privacy Education Program For Be-
haviorally Targeted Advertising (Oct. 30, 2007), available at
http://corp.aol.com/node/366/print ("The expanded use of the TACODA opt-out technology
will help better preserve consumer choices, . . . TACODA leverages a Web cache technique
to preserve a consumers' opt-out choice even if they delete their browser cookies, something
other opt-out systems cannot currently do.").
239 FTC, supra note 80, at 3.
240 See discussion supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
241 One important consumer, FTC Commissioner Jon Leibowitz, recently expressed his
own frustration with the "invisibility" of BT, commenting that "I am concerned ... when
my online conduct is monitored across several Web sites, especially when there's no effec-
tive notice or consent." Grant Gross, Critic: FTC Needs to Take Action on Targeted Ads,
MACWORLD, Nov. 1, 2007,
http://www.macworld.com/article/60844/2007/1 1/targetedads.html.
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nology, balancing individual privacy rights with the need to support continued
innovation in the online advertising industry.

